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PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE COMPLEMENTARITY 
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW—DEMONSTRATED BY THE PROCEDURAL REGULATION OF 
INTERNMENT IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
Laura M. Olson*
This article—using the procedural regulation of internment as an 
example—outlines some of the practical challenges in assessing the inter-
relationship between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law (IHRL), in order to draw attention to certain risks 
so they may be avoided, as well as to stimulate proposals to address these 
challenges. The international humanitarian treaty law procedurally regulat-
ing internment is described briefly. This is followed by an exploration of the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL. Differences between IHL and IHRL 
are presented, and, by focusing on the procedural regulation of internment, 
the way these differences give rise to complications, when attempting to 
harmonize the two sets of legal norms, is demonstrated. In conclusion, an 
initiative is proposed that may assist the practitioner in addressing the 
complementarity between IHL and IHRL in concrete situations, thereby 
helping to ensure the fullest protection of the law to persons interned. 
INTRODUCTION
Internment—the deprivation of liberty of a person without criminal 
charge as a preventative security measure—frequently occurs during armed 
conflict. Such deprivation of a person’s liberty is one of the most extreme 
measures that can be taken and hence requires adherence to safeguards. 
Respecting and enforcing these safeguards necessitate understanding not 
only which rules apply to the situation but also the content of those rules. 
No international humanitarian law (IHL) treaty rules applicable in non-
international armed conflicts procedurally regulate internment. International 
human rights law (IHRL) may provide regulation by complementing IHL. 
However, without clarity on the relationship between IHL and IHRL, it is 
impossible to understand and implement the applicable law so as to provide 
the fullest protection of the law to persons interned, particularly in relation 
to non-international armed conflict.
* Visiting Scholar, Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of Notre Dame Law 
School.
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Increased attention to internment—largely caused by the controver-
sy over the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility—has initiated calls for new 
international rules—by some to respond to security concerns caused by 
“modern threats” and by others to ensure greater protection for persons af-
fected by armed conflict or to address the familiar challenge of determining 
whether a situation reaches the threshold of armed conflict for application of 
IHL.1 This has been accompanied by interest to renew the decades-long 
discussion on the establishment of minimum common standards applicable 
at all times.2 Yet, generally formulated minimum standards will require 
precise content so as to avoid varying interpretations of the standard. Addi-
tionally, prior to engaging in the creation of new treaties, it is important to 
have as accurate an understanding as possible of the present law, otherwise 
the outcome could result in the establishment of rules that are lower than 
existing standards. Such initiatives make the need for clarity on the relation-
ship between IHL and IHRL with regard to internment regulation particular-
ly urgent. 
This article—using the procedural regulation of internment as an 
example—outlines some of the practical challenges in assessing the inter-
relationship between IHL and IHRL in order to draw attention to certain 
risks so they may be avoided, as well as to stimulate proposals to address 
1   See, e.g., Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., Should National Security Trump Human Rights in the 
Fight Against Terrorism?, 37 ISR. Y.B. OF HUM. RTS. 85, 86–94 (2007).
2  See Theodor Meron & Allan Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Stan-
dards, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 377–381 (1991) (formulated and adopted by experts in Finland 
in 1990); See also Asbjorn Eide, Allan Rosas & Theodor Meron, Combating Lawlessness in 
Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 215 
(1995). Relevant United Nations documents include: The Secretary General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Fundamental Standards of Humanity, delivered to the U.N. Econ. 
& Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN/4/2004/90 (Feb. 25, 2004); Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/65, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1999/65 (Apr. 28, 1999); Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/69, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2000/69 (Apr. 26, 2000). See generally Theodor Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 
589, 605 (1983).  In 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presented 
its institutional guidelines on internment, which “[set] out a series of broad principles and 
specific safeguards that the ICRC believes should, at a minimum, govern any form of deten-
tion without criminal charges.” INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES 
OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 11, 30IC/07/8.4 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ihl-30-international-conference-101207/ 
$File/IHL-challenges-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf; these ICRC institutional 
guidelines, entitled “Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence,” Annex 1, id., were originally 
published as Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Intern-
ment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 375 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng
0.nsf/htmlall/30-international-conference-working-documents-121007/$File/30IC_IHL 
challenges_Annex1_Detention_FINAL_EN.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Guidelines].  
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these challenges. The first section of this article provides background by 
briefly describing the international humanitarian treaty law procedurally 
regulating internment. This is followed by a section discussing the relation-
ship between IHL and IHRL. The third section presents some of the differ-
ences between IHL and IHRL and, by focusing on the procedural regulation 
of internment, demonstrates how these differences can give rise to compli-
cations when attempting to harmonize the two sets of legal norms. Finally, 
the last section presents an initiative that, if accomplished, may assist the 
practitioner in addressing the complementarity between IHL and IHRL in 
concrete situations.  
PROCEDURAL REGULATION OF INTERNMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
This section briefly outlines existing IHL treaty rules3 regulating in-
ternment. The purpose in doing so is to provide both a general understand-
ing of the extent of IHL protections and a starting point for the discussion 
on the IHL–IHRL relationship that follows. Here only the procedural pro-
tections IHL provides will be highlighted, although IHL also regulates the 
treatment and conditions of persons interned during armed conflict. The 
focus of this article is non-international armed conflict; nevertheless, rules 
applicable in international armed conflicts will be mentioned. This is done 
for two reasons: first, to demonstrate the paucity of procedural rules appli-
cable in non-international armed conflict as compared with international 
armed conflict and, second, because of that paucity, to gain insight from the 
rules of international armed conflict to evaluate what may best work to ad-
dress procedural matters in non-international armed conflict. 
IHL provides grounds for possible internment in international 
armed conflict under certain conditions for specific categories of protected 
persons. The First and Second Geneva Conventions regulate the retention of 
medical and religious personnel “only in so far as the state of health, the 
spiritual needs and the number of prisoners of war require.”4 The Third Ge-
neva Convention stipulates that “[t]he Detaining Power may subject prison-
3 An articulation of specific customary rules is beyond the scope of this article. Customa-
ry international law, of course, must be considered in any analysis undertaken. See generally
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005).  
4 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 28, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
First Geneva Convention]; see also id. at arts. 30, 32; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
arts. 36–37, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Con-
vention]. 
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ers of war to internment.”5 Concerning civilians, the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention provides that—as to aliens in the territory of a party to the con-
flict—“[t]he internment or placing in assigned residence of protected per-
sons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it 
absolutely necessary.”6 In an occupied territory, “[i]f the Occupying Power 
considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety 
measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most subject them to 
assigned residence or to internment.”7
In contrast, IHL treaty law applicable to non-international armed 
conflict provides no specific grounds for internment. Yet, IHL treaty law 
contemplates that internment occurs in non-international armed conflict, as 
demonstrated by the references to internment found in Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Second Additional Protocol.8 Article 3 common to the Four Geneva 
Conventions (Common Article 3) makes no reference to internment.  
As IHL applicable to international armed conflict provides guidance 
on when internment may occur or begin, it should, thus, also stipulate when 
the captivity must end.  Retention of medical and religious personnel must 
cease if prisoners of war are not in need.9 According to the Third Geneva 
Convention, repatriation of prisoners of war takes place due to medical rea-
sons during the conflict,10 and release and repatriation for all, without delay, 
must occur after the cessation of active hostilities.11 Unlike prisoners of war 
(with no medical reason requiring release), civilian internees may not neces-
sarily be interned until the end of conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention 
provides that a civilian must be released “as soon as the reasons which ne-
cessitated his internment no longer exist;”12 this may be during the conflict. 
If, however, civilians remain interned for the duration of the conflict, 
“[i]nternment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.”13
5 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 21, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
6 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 
42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 356, 75 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
7 Id. at art.78. 
8 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 5, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. “[T]he following provisions 
shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of liberty for reasons re-
lated to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained . . . .” 
9 First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 28; Second Geneva Convention, supra 
note 4, at art. 37. 
10 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, at 109–17.   
11 Id. at art. 118. But see, id. at art. 119(5). 
12 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, at art. 132.  
13 Id. at art. 133.  
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Of the above-mentioned grounds for internment, generally only the 
basis for interning a civilian requires an assessment,14 as civilians—unlike 
combatants who are captured and become prisoners of war—may only be 
interned if and for the duration that they pose a security threat. The Fourth 
Geneva Convention provides internment review procedures applicable to 
civilian internees, giving some detail regarding the type of body and timing 
of review. For aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention states: 
Any protected person who has been interned . . . shall be entitled to have 
such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or 
administrative board . . . . If the internment . . . is maintained, the court or 
administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give con-
sideration to his or her case, with a view to the favorable amendment of 
the initial decision, if circumstances permit.15
For those interned in occupied territory, the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion similarly provides that:
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made 
according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power 
in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This proce-
dure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals 
shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision 
being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six 
months, by a competent body set up by the said Power.16
And, the First Additional Protocol indicates certain safeguards for 
the individual in the process:  
Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed 
conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the 
reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or 
detention for penal offenses, such persons shall be released with the mini-
14 Reviews of medical reasons for the release of prisoners of war also take place. Third 
Geneva Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 109–17. The issue of a person’s status, i.e., wheth-
er he or she fits into a specific protected person category, is not addressed for the purposes of 
this discussion. If it were addressed, reference would be made to Article 5 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention, which provides for determination of prisoner of war status by a competent 
tribunal when such status is in doubt. Id. at art. 5.  
15 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, at art. 43(1). 
16 Id. at art. 78(2). 
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mum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justify-
ing the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.17
The Second Additional Protocol applicable in non-international 
armed conflict briefly mentions internment,18 but provides no guidance re-
garding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate 
captivity. Again, Common Article 3 does not speak to the issue.
While IHL treaties applicable to international armed conflict pro-
vide greater detail on the regulation of internment than does IHL applicable 
to non-international armed conflict, some consider the law applicable to 
international armed conflict to lack sufficient precision with regard to pro-
cedural regulation.19 If, however, IHRL were to complement IHL, then the 
applicable procedural rules may not be so sparse.20  Understanding the IHL–
IHRL relationship could alleviate protection concerns in international 
armed conflicts, but it is crucial for providing procedural protection to per-
sons interned in situations of non-international armed conflicts.21
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  
18 The Second Additional Protocol only states that “[i]f it is decided to release persons 
deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so 
deciding.” Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, at art. 5(4). In the Second Additional Proto-
col’s suggestion to grant amnesty for participation in hostilities, internment is mentioned: 
“[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of 
their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” 
Id. at art. 6(5) (emphasis added).  
19 Even though internment in international armed conflicts is regulated by the Fourth  
Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, these treaties do not sufficiently 
elaborate on the procedural rights of internees, nor do they specify the details of 
the legal framework that a detaining authority must implement. In non-
international armed conflicts there is even less clarity on how internment is to be 
organized.
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 2, at 377.  
20 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Con-
vention on Human Rights art. 7, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 6–7, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 246. 
21 A specific analysis of customary IHL regulating this matter would be worthwhile. See
generally 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3.  
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A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW
The relationship between IHL and IHRL is often referred to as 
complementary.22 However, both disagreement and obscurity remain as to 
what that means in practice. Some consider that IHL totally displaces IHRL, 
and others argue for complete application of IHRL in times of armed con-
flict, nearly displacing IHL. These extreme propositions are asserted with 
little or no explanation, and in practice both positions risk undermining the 
protection provided by these two bodies of law that seek to protect the per-
son, but do so in different ways.23 This section seeks to outline some of the 
complexities of the IHL–IHRL relationship in hopes of better understanding 
it and facilitating its practical implementation in a manner that does not 
undermine the protection provided by either body of law. 
Looking first to the treaties of IHL and IHRL, they indicate a rela-
tionship between the two branches of law. Both the First and Second Addi-
tional Protocols make reference to human rights. The First Additional Pro-
tocol provides:  
The provisions of this Section [Treatment of Persons in the Power of a 
Party to the Conflict] are additional to the rules concerning humanitarian 
protection of civilians and civilian objects in the power of a Party to the 
conflict contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly parts I and III 
thereof, as well as to other applicable rules of international law relating to 
the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed 
conflict.24
The Second Additional Protocol recalls in its preamble that "inter-
national instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the 
human person."25 It “establishes the link between Protocol II and the inter-
22 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add 13 (Mar. 29, 2004); ICRC Guidelines, supra note 2, at 377.   
23 See generally Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Inter-State Wars and Human 
Rights, 7 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RIGHTs 139 (1977); Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Con-
flict: International Humanitarian Law, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL 
AND POLICY ISSUES 345 (T. Meron ed. 1983); Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vité, Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 94 
(1993); Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. OF CONFLICT & SECURITY 
LAW 265, 266–68 (2006); Theodor Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law and the Need for the New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 589 (1983).  
24 Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 72 (emphasis added). See also id. at art. 
75(8).
25 Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, at pmbl.  
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national instruments on human rights,”26 which include, for example, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, as well as regional instruments on human rights.27 The ICRC 
Commentary explains that “[h]uman rights continue to apply concurrently 
in time of armed conflict,”28 although some human rights treaties provide 
for suspension of some rights “[i]n time of public emergency which threat-
ens the life of the nation.”29
Human rights treaties generally do not specifically delimit their 
temporal scopes of application in the same way as do IHL treaties, which 
confine application to situations of armed conflict. Application of certain 
IHRL treaties may be limited, however, by provisions such as derogation 
clauses, among others. The possible non-applicability in extreme situa-
tions,30 such as armed conflict, of certain provisions of these IHRL treaties 
through their derogation clauses indicates that IHRL applies in such cir-
cumstances, unless an affirmative step is taken to derogate.31 The inclusion 
of derogation clauses in IHRL treaties would not be necessary if the treaties 
never applied in those extreme situations, such as armed conflict,32 thus, 
demonstrating concurrent application of IHL and IHRL. 
26 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS
OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 1339 (Yvez Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
27 Id. ¶ 4428. 
28 Id. ¶ 4429. See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 26, ¶ 2933. 
29 ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 4(1).  
30 For example, the ICCPR, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights contain derogation 
clauses, although they are formulated differently. Extreme situations are understood as fol-
lows: “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . .” ICCPR, 
supra note 20, at art. 4(1); “[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation . . . .” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 20, at art. 15(1); “[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threat-
ens the independence or security of a State Party . . . .” American Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 20, at art. 27(1). 
31 If this step is taken then the suspension measures may only affect the derogable provi-
sions and those only “[t]o the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, pro-
vided that such measures are not inconsistent with . . . other obligations under international 
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language,
religion and social origin.” ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 4(1). See also Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 20, at art. 15(1); Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 27(1). 
32 Unlike the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the American Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, in its derogation clause, does 
not specifically mention war. See ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 4(1); Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 20, at art. 15(1); Ameri-
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Furthermore, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed that 
“the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation          
. . . .”33 This confirmation of the complementarity of IHL and IHRL permits 
a starting point to understanding the relationship of the one branch of law to 
the other. Yet, the ICJ provided little guidance on how complementarity is 
to function in practice or specifically how to resolve situations of conflict, 
and the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion, while definite and wide-ranging in its 
scope, remains controversial.34 The task, therefore, is to figure out how to 
apply this assertion such that: (1) relevant rules and their content may be 
identified and applied in practice;  or (2) gaps in international law may be 
revealed.
In 1996, the ICJ stated that “the test of what is an arbitrary depriva-
tion of life . . . then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities.”35 Citing this ICJ Advisory Opinion, IHL is regu-
larly referred to as lex specialis vis-à-vis human rights law; this reference is 
frequently pronounced but rarely given precision. Can it adequately explain 
the relationship between IHL and IHRL?  Does lex specialis fully explain 
what it means to declare that the two bodies of law are complementary? 
More concretely, can applying the lex specialis maxim answer questions 
regarding what IHL and IHRL mandate with respect to procedural regula-
tion of internment during non-international armed conflict? To answer these 
                                                     
can Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 27(1). However, the Human Rights 
Committee clarified this point in its General Comment 31:  
As implied in General Comment 29 [on States of Emergencies], the Covenant ap-
plies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humani-
tarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specif-
ic rules of international humanitarian law may be specifically relevant for the pur-
poses of interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, 
not mutually exclusive. 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 22, ¶ 11 (citing U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (July 24, 2001)).  
33 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ry, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9, 2004). See also Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8). 
34 Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 597 
(2006). See also Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion 
on Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2005).
35 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 33, ¶ 25. “[T]he Court 
will have to take into consideration both of these branches of law, namely human rights law 
and international humanitarian law.” Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 33, ¶ 106. 
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questions first requires further consideration of the maxim lex specialis de-
rogat legi generali.
Lex specialis derogat legi generali is a tool of interpretation and 
conflict resolution.36 When applied narrowly, it is employed only “to re-
solve a genuine conflict between two norms,”37 thus, “in the event of con-
flict, the more special norm prevails over the more general norm.”38 The 
broader conception of lex specialis has the rule operating in “two different 
contexts . . . , namely lex specialis as an elaboration or application of gener-
al law in a particular situation and lex specialis as an exception to the gener-
al law.”39 In other words, the lex specialis maxim indicates the order of pre-
ference between two rules that apply to the same problem, but regulate it 
differently.  
The priority given to the more specific is “justified by the fact that 
such special law, being more concrete, often takes better account of the par-
ticular features of the context in which it is to be applied than any applicable 
general law.”40 The rationale behind the maxim—to apply the most specific 
rule—“is to give effect to the intentions of the parties and to take into ac-
count the particularities of the case. In this sense, it is an expression of con-
36 Case law containing reference to lex specialis doctrine is limited, and academic litera-
ture conducts little analysis of the maxim itself. See Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversifica-
tion and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) 
(finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC Report of Study Group]; Anja Lindroos, 
Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 
NORDIC J. OF INT’L LAW 27, 37–38 (2005); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and 
the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 483,
488 (2006). Such traditional resolving devices, such as lex specialis, are not completely 
unquestioned. See Jörg Kammerhofer, Unearthing Structural Uncertainty Through Neo-
Kelsenian Consistency: Conflicts of Norms in International Law, ESIL Research Forum on 
International Law: Contemporary Issues, available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdf/ 
Kammerhofer.pdf.
37 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (2003). See also Lindroos, supra note
36, at 46–47; Martti Koskenniemi, Study on the Function and Scope of Lex Specialis Rule 
and the Question of “Self-Contained Regimes,” ¶¶ 61–81, ILC, ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1 
(May 7, 2004). There are also varying definitions of conflict, some broader than others. See
Eric Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal Theory, 17 
EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 395 (2006). 
38 PAUWELYN, supra note 37, at 385.  
39 U.N International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on its 
Fifty-Fifth Session, ¶ 431, U.N. Doc. A/58/10(Supp) (Jan. 1, 2003). The ILC Report “adopts 
a wide notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways 
of dealing with a problem.” ILC Report of Study Group 2006, supra note 36, ¶ 25. 
40 U.N. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on 
its Fifty-Eighth Session, ¶ 251(7), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (Jan. 10, 2006). 
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sent and can easily be accepted in the international legal system, which of 
course has a strong consensual basis.”41
There are, however, fundamental limitations to the lex specialis 
maxim.42 This maxim functions when it is clear which rule is the more gen-
eral rule and which is the more specific, but it cannot be applied without 
knowing that starting point.  The challenge then becomes to assess appro-
priately the general rule and the specific rule in order to apply the maxim. 
What should guide this assessment within the international legal system, 
which does not conform to the familiar logic of domestic legal systems? 
The differences between the international and domestic systems must be 
considered, as they may indicate limitations to the role that the traditional 
maxim of lex specialis can play in the international legal system.43 For ex-
ample, it has been questioned “to what extent this maxim [lex specialis] can 
be used in an international legal system which lacks hierarchy and institu-
tional structures.”44
Another challenge in applying the lex specialis maxim, which spe-
cifically affects the IHL–IHRL relationship, is that “[t]he increased frag-
mentation of international law has been accompanied by a more problematic 
phenomenon: institutional fragmentation that has strengthened the role of 
specialized regimes (e.g., WTO, EU, human rights and environmental re-
gimes) within the international legal system.”45 As both IHL and IHRL are 
41 Lindroos, supra note 36, at 36. 
42 Not all limitations of the lex specialis maxim are discussed here. For elaboration, see 
ILC Report of Study Group 2006, supra note 36, ¶¶ 58–122; Lindroos, supra note 36, at 39–
44; Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 36, at 488–90; Marco Sassòli, Le Droit International 
Humanitaire, Une Lex Specialis par Rapport aux Droit Humains?, in LE DROITS DE 
L’HOMEE ET LA CONSTITUTION, ETUDES EN L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR GIORGIO MALINVERNI 
(AUER, FLÜCKIGER, HOTTELIER EDS.) 375, 380–85 (2007).
43 See Lindroos, supra note 36, at 27–28; ILC Report of Study Group 2006, supra note 36, 
¶ 324. For further discussion on norm hierarchy, specifically regarding jus cogens, article 
103 of the UN Charter and erga omnes, see ILC Report of Study Group 2006, supra note 36, 
¶¶ 324–409; Michael J. Matheson, The Fifty-Eighth Session of the International Law Com-
mission, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 424–26 (2007). Even if one accepts the role of jus cogens,
there are few norms of jus cogens and “their content is often unclear.” Lindroos, supra note
36, at 29. See also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 36, at 498. Rules of both IHL and IHRL 
are considered jus cogens, e.g., racial discrimination, torture and “the basic rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.” U.N International Law Commission, 
supra note 40, ¶ 251(33); See also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 26, ¶ 4430. 
“[W]hile some members [ILC] were interested in expanding the list of jus cogens norms (in 
particular in the area of human rights), the group realized—after much discussion—that 
negotiating a new list was not feasible or desirable, and in the end the conclusions merely 
note that the ‘most frequently cited examples’ are the ones already affirmed in the 2001 
commentary.” Matheson, supra, at 424, citing U.N International Law Commission, supra
note 40, ¶ 251(33).
 44  Lindroos, supra note 36, at 30.  
 45  Lindroos, supra note 36, at 27; See generally Vranes, supra note 37.
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specialized regimes,46 how effective can the maxim of lex specialis be if 
there is no clear solution to determine relations between two specialized 
regimes?  
The limitations of the lex specialis maxim can be better understood 
if one remembers that it is “not a hard and fast rule but an interpretive tool 
to be used with other factors and principles in reaching a sensible result.”47 
This leads to the final limitation of the maxim that will be mentioned: lex
specialis is only one of several interpretive tools. “[T]he relationship be-
tween lex specialis and other norms of interpretation [e.g., lex posterior 
derogat legi priori] or conflict solution cannot be determined in a general 
way . . . [but] should be decided contextually.”48
That is, in a given situation one answer to a conflict between norms may 
be suggested by lex specialis but another by the later-in-time principle       
. . . , and there is no overriding rule that determines which must prevail. 
Rather, decision makers or adjudicators must consider all aspects of the 
context of the specific situation, including the apparent intent of the parties 
and the overall object and purpose of the regimes in question.49
Most IHRL treaties entered into force after many of the IHL trea-
ties. Thus, the maxim of lex posterior must be considered when evaluating 
the IHL–IHRL relationship.
The lex specialis maxim is a contextual principle and, as such, is 
better suited to determine relations between two legal norms in concrete 
cases rather than in the abstract.50 For example, in its Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ was “reluc-
tant to state that one area of law could override another as lex specialis and 
generally be considered the special law.”51 The ICJ noted that IHRL does 
not cease in times of war and is “not categorically set aside”52 by IHL. IHL 
 46  U.N. International Law Commission, supra note 40, ¶ 251(12). For further discussion 
on self-contained regimes, see ILC Report of Study Group 2006, supra note 36, ¶¶ 123–219; 
Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 36. 
 47  Matheson, supra note 43, at 427 (emphasis added).  
 48  U.N. International Law Commission, supra note 40, ¶ 251(6). 
 49  Matheson, supra note 43, at 427.  
 50  Lindroos, supra note 36, at 42. 
 51 Id. at 43.  
 52 Id. With regard to this case, Koskenniemi points out that “the use of the lex specialis 
maxim did not intend to suggest that human rights were abolished in war. It did not function 
in a formal or absolute way but as an aspect of the pragmatics of the Court’s reasoning. 
However, desirable it might be to discard the difference between peace and armed conflict by 
abolishing the latter altogether, the exception that war continues to be the normality of peace 
could not simply be overlooked when determining what standards should be used to judge 
behavior in those (exceptional) circumstances.” Koskenniemi, supra note 37, at  
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and IHRL demonstrate how difficult it is to designate one area of law as 
being special over another, even with IHL and IHRL, where both branches 
of law seek to protect the person but do so with “distinct aims and norma-
tive scopes.”53
It is not the body of the law that should be the focus, but the specif-
ic provision and the unique situation in which the provision is applied. 
Thus, it cannot be presumed in situations where IHL and IHRL both regu-
late the matter that IHL is always lex specialis. As the ICJ wrote, “[a]s re-
gards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be ex-
clusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclu-
sively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law.”54
The limitations of the lex specialis maxim mean that it alone cannot 
explain the complementary relationship between IHL and IHRL. To apply 
lex specialis, the initial determination of which rule is the more specific and 
which the more general leaves much discretion to the decision maker:  
Giving priority to a special norm within the system of unclear norm rela-
tions in which a decision cannot rely on such relations, the decision actual-
ly relies on political or other considerations. Whether environmental pro-
tection should be higher priority than trade norm . . . is a highly value-
based decision. Such decisions are political choices.55
Yet, are there no constraints to the decision maker’s discretion? 
What ensures predictability and uniformity? The final section of this article 
proposes an initiative that may respond to these questions, but, first, the next 
section takes a look at some important differences between IHL and IHRL 
and how they impact the complementary application of IHL and IHRL. 
                                                     
¶ 76. One can, therefore conclude that “[d]eterming a rule to be lex specialis does not mean 
the exclusion of the normative environment, but modification of certain rules to the extent 
provided by the specific rule.” Lindroos, supra note 36, at 65.  
 53  Lindroos, supra note 36, at 44. 
 54  Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Construction of the Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, supra note 33, ¶ 106. See Sassòli, supra note 42, at 385–95 (presenting 
six possible situations as regards the IHL–IHRL relationship). 
 55  Lindroos, supra note 36, at 42. “Such issues also demonstrate the interplay between the 
legal and the political and challenge the idea that these realms can be hermetically sealed 
from one another.” Barnidge, supra note 1, at 14. 
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HOW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IHL AND IHRL IMPACT THEIR
COMPLEMENTARY REGULATION OF INTERNMENT IN NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT
Although IHL and IHRL both aim to protect the human person, 
their respective approaches to that end differ. These differences must be 
respected in order for each body of law to achieve its protective aims. The 
purpose and scope of the two bodies of law and their different historical 
origins and development must be considered when determining how IHL 
and IHRL interrelate.56
For example, a main distinction between IHL and IHRL is who is 
bound by the law. IHL applies equally to all parties to the armed conflict:  
This is necessary not only because victims must equally be protected from 
rebel forces but also because, if IHL did not respect the principle of the 
equality of belligerents before it in non-international armed conflicts, it 
would have an even smaller chance of being respected by either the gov-
ernmental forces, because they would not benefit from any protection un-
der it, or by the opposing forces, because they could claim not to be bound 
by it.57
Thus, while in non-international armed conflict IHL equally binds 
states and non-state actors, the traditional position is that IHRL creates legal 
obligations only for state authorities. Thus, private individuals or groups, 
i.e., non-state actors, do not have the legal capacity to violate IHRL.58
 56 See generally Dinstein, The International Law of Inter-State Wars and Human Rights,
supra note 23; Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian,
supra note 23; Doswald-Beck, supra note 23; Krieger, supra note 23; Meron, supra note 23.  
 57  MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE BOUVIER ET AL., 1 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 214 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 58  Modern trends in human rights practice indicate some modification of the traditional 
position; nevertheless, “the exact meaning, scope, pertinence and legal implications of an 
assertion that . . . non-State actors are bound by human rights law and may be held account-
able for violating it remain very controversial.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights, ¶ 54, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (June 25, 2004) (prepared by Kalliopi K. Koufa). “The major 
argument against application of human rights obligations to non-State actors stresses that this 
would carry the risk that States might defer their responsibility onto these actors, which 
might diminish existing State obligations and accountability. In fact, the development of 
human rights law as a means of holding Governments accountable to a common standard has 
been one of the major achievements of the United Nations.” Id. ¶ 55 (citation omitted). Ac-
cordingly, United Nations experts have cautioned against giving non-state actors the capacity 
to violate IHRL, as it could provide an excuse to governments for their own human rights 
violations. These UN experts maintain that focus should be on the adverse effects that ac-
tions by non-state actors have on the enjoyment of human rights, rather than citing such 
groups as possible IHRL violators. Id. On the other side, it is argued that “the overall human 
rights movement may have been concentrating, possibly for too long, on the repressive 
measures adopted by Governments only, without paying much attention to the means used by 
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This difference in application between IHL and IHRL must be 
taken into account when addressing their complementarity in non-
international armed conflict. The procedural regulation of internment pro-
vides a demonstration of how critical this difference can be. Take, for ex-
ample, the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, which is con-
sidered to be a rule of customary IHL applicable in non-international armed 
conflict.59 As few IHL treaty rules exist to provide guidance on regulating 
internment in non-international armed conflict,60 how is the IHL prohibition 
on arbitrary deprivation of liberty applicable in non-international armed 
conflict to be interpreted—what is the content of the rule?  
Applying the maxim of lex specialis, one could use IHRL to rein-
force IHL. If in a given situation IHRL is the general law, the lex specialis
maxim permits interpretation of the IHL rule “in light of the more general 
human rights norm.”61 In such a case, the customary IHL rule prohibiting 
the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in non-international armed conflict can 
be seen as an application of the more general human rights law, such that 
the IHL rule is interpreted through the lens of IHRL.  
For example, one of the safeguards required by IHRL treaty provi-
sions so as not to violate the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of lib-
erty provides that no person may be deprived of liberty except for reasons 
previously established by law.62 Applying the lex specialis maxim as just 
                                                     
those opposing them.” Id. (citation omitted). As non-state actors are not currently considered 
as capable of violating human rights, they avoid the scrutiny of the international community 
despite the fact that their actions may constitute massive violations of human rights if they 
were committed by a state. Id. This contradiction in accountability is more pronounced in 
situations where non-state actors control territory and populations and resemble de facto
governments.
However, it should not be forgotten that non-state actors may still be held accountable for 
their actions, as they are bound by domestic law. Moreover, international human rights bod-
ies such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court 
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have dealt with positive obligations of 
states to protect persons from abuses committed by non-state actors, such as violence, envi-
ronmental impact of industries, or investigations and punishment of crimes committed by 
private individuals. 
 59  1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 344. 
 60  1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 344 (“Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, as well as both Additional Protocols I and II, require that all civilians and per-
sons hors de combat be treated humanely . . . , whereas arbitrary deprivation of liberty is not 
compatible with this requirement.”) (citation omitted). See also discussion supra, notes 3–21. 
 61  Krieger, supra note 23, at 275. The maxim of lex specialis “is not exclusively restricted 
to the specific norm overriding the more general norm. . . . [A] special norm can be seen as 
an application of the more general norm,” and the former interpreted in light of the latter. Id.
 62  1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 348. See also ICCPR, supra note
20, at art. 9(1); Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 20, at art. 5(1); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 7; 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 20, at art. 6.  
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mentioned, the IHL rule could then be interpreted to require, among its 
other safeguards, that the law provide the reasons for the internment. In 
other words, parties to a non-international armed conflict would violate the 
IHL rule prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of liberty if the parties interned 
persons without the basis for internment being derived from law.63
This seems fairly straightforward except that there is one diffi-
culty—IHL treaty law applicable in non-international armed conflict pro-
vides no legal basis for internment.64 States, in order to ensure that they do 
not violate the IHL rule prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, can 
easily meet the requirement by incorporating such a provision in their do-
mestic law. However, what about the non-state actor? It is highly unlikely 
that a state’s domestic law would authorize a “rebel” group to deprive the 
state’s citizens, including members of its armed forces, of their liberty. How 
are non-state actors to provide by law the reasons for internment? Can non-
state actors respect an IHRL concept, which was inherently constructed as 
an obligation on states? If the non-state actor cannot provide by law the 
reasons for internment, the non-state actor violates IHL by interning per-
sons.
Until the use of IHRL to interpret or give content to the IHL custo-
mary rule prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, treaty rules of IHL 
applicable to non-international armed conflict did not address this substan-
tive aspect of the principle of legality. It was addressed by applicable IHRL 
as well as domestic law, and violations of the principle were not violations 
of IHL but of these other bodies of law. Given the structure of IHL, this 
change is cause for concern.65
 63  1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 347–48. 
 64  This is in contrast to IHL applicable in international armed conflicts. See discussion 
supra, notes 4–8. Customary IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict appears not 
to provide the legal basis. See generally 1 HENCKAERTS AND DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3. 
However, specific inquiry into the existence of customary IHL regulating this matter would 
be worthwhile.  
 65  Application of judicial guarantees could pose a similar concern, if IHRL is used to 
interpret the IHL provisions. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, at art. 3(1)(d); 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 6. See generally Jonathan Somer, Jungle Justice: 
passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-international armed conflict, 89 INT’L
REV RED CROSS 655 (2007). However, the problem is not exactly the same. IHL does not 
require the non-state actor to intern persons, but the exigencies of armed conflict will most 
likely result in or require internment. In contrast, neither IHL nor the urgent reality of armed 
conflict require a non-state actor to try persons. For example, the customary IHL obligation 
with regard to investigating and prosecuting serious violations of IHL committed in non-
international armed conflict rests only with states. See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK,
supra note 3, at 607. IHL can only apply equally to parties to a non-international armed 
conflict if it recognizes the practical differences between the state and the non-state actor. 
See, e.g., Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, at art. 6(5) (specifying that the “authorities in 
power” should undertake the action). 
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In order to explain this concern, a parallel will be drawn to the issue 
of the legality of non-state actors taking up arms against the state—
engaging in armed conflict. This is not a matter regulated by IHL, but by 
domestic law,66 and it is hard to imagine domestic legislation doing any-
thing but prohibiting such action.67 Thus, while a non-state actor by the 
mere fact of engaging in armed conflict violates domestic law, it does not 
violate IHL. IHL addresses the reality that non-international armed conflict 
exists—and that internment will occur during it—“by regulating it to ensure 
a minimum of humanity in this . . . illegal situation.”68
If a non-state actor cannot legally intern under IHL, what is a non-
state actor to do when it captures, say, members of the state’s armed forces? 
Usually a party to the armed conflict will intern them until the end of hostil-
ities so that they cannot again take up arms against them. Unless the law 
provides the reason for internment, however, IHL prohibits the non-state 
actor from interning, and it is a serious violation of IHL to deny quarter.69
Left with little option, the non-state actor is required to return captured 
enemy fighters. Is that a viable rule of IHL? If IHL rules make efficient 
fighting impossible, it is unlikely that the rules will be respected, thereby 
undermining the minimum of humanity that IHL seeks to ensure.70 “For 
practical, policy, and humanitarian reasons, IHL has . . . to be the same for 
both belligerents . . . . From a practical point of view, the respect of IHL 
could otherwise not be obtained . . . .”71
 66  The use of force between states (international armed conflict) is a matter regulated by 
international law, i.e., jus ad bellum (as distinct from jus in bello).
 67  This explains the incorporation of art. 6(5) into the Second Additional Protocol of 
1977. Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, at art. 6(5) (stating that at the end of hostilities 
authorities should grant broad amnesty to armed conflict participants and those deprived of 
liberty in relation to the armed conflict). Without amnesty, non-state actors may be reluctant 
to put down their arms because they likely violated domestic criminal law by their participa-
tion in hostilities. 
 68  1 SASSÒLI & BOUVIER ET AL, supra note 57, at 102–03. 
 69  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF 183/9, 37 ILM 
1002 (1998) 2187 UNTS 90, arts. 8(2)(b)(xii), 8(2)(e)(x) (July 1, 2002). See also 1 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 3, at 161. 
 70  Similar reasoning drives proposals for the inclusion of an exclusionary clause in the 
draft comprehensive convention against international terrorism. By excluding acts legal 
under IHL from the draft convention’s prohibited acts, state and non-state actors are treated 
equally; “the advantage of this . . . is that, it gives the latter [non-state actors] an incentive to 
accept and abide by international standards.” Daniel O’Donnell, International Treaties 
Against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism During Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces,
88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED Cross 853, 876 (2006). 
 71  1 SASSÒLI & BOUVIER ET AL, supra note 57, at 103. 
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This dilemma can possibly be avoided, if IHRL is not used to in-
terpret72 an IHL rule, but instead IHRL is used as a complement to IHL in 
the sense of applying simultaneously, yet separately. In other words, apply 
IHRL “next to” IHL, instead of “within” IHL. IHL would apply to parties to 
the conflict, both state and non-state actors, and IHRL would continue to 
apply to state actors, as it was traditionally designed to do. This avoids the 
problematic application to non-state actors, and, yet, mandates states to con-
tinue to meet their international legal obligations. One may claim this is 
unfair, as states would need to abide by more obligations than non-state 
actors in a non-international armed conflict. This is true at the international 
law level, where states are traditionally the legal actors; but it would only be 
true of the rules to which the states obligated themselves. Also, it must not 
be forgotten that non-state actors remain bound by domestic law.  
Even when a situation appears simple, such as in the next example, 
assessing the IHL–IHRL relationship can raise questions not so easily ans-
wered. It would seem straightforward that, if there is no conflict between an 
IHL rule and one of IHRL because the former is silent on the matter, IHRL 
automatically applies to fill in the gap. Yet, one must not be too hasty to use 
IHRL to fill apparent gaps in IHL.   
For example, IHL applicable in international armed conflicts pro-
vides no review of a prisoner of war’s continued internment. As IHL is si-
lent, it would seem that the IHRL rule requiring judicial review of the law-
fulness of the deprivation of liberty73 should apply. IHRL is clearly more 
precise on this point than IHL. However, the fact that IHL’s silence prevails 
over IHRL in this circumstance requires an understanding of the specific 
purpose for the internment of prisoners of war under IHL. Captured comba-
tants, simply because they are opposing combatants, are interned in order to 
prevent them from returning to the battlefield. Except when doubt arises as 
to whether the person is a combatant,74 there is no need for an individual 
review, as the internment is not based on any particular individual characte-
ristic and would run counter to the objective of IHL, as concerns the in-
ternment of prisoners of war.75
As the reasoning behind the basis for internment of prisoners of war 
under IHL is unique, the reasoning does not extend to interned civilians in 
an international armed conflict or persons interned in a non-international 
 72  For other concerns regarding use of IHRL to interpret IHL, see generally Krieger, 
supra note 23.  
 73 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 9(4).  
 74 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5. 
 75  Sassòli, supra note 42, at 386–87. See also 1 SASSÒLI & BOUVIER ET AL, supra note 57, 
at 154-55. Thus, this “gap” in IHL is instead an intentional omission, a “qualified silence.” 
Gloria Gaggioli and Robert Kolb, A Right to Life in Armed Conflicts? The Contribution of 
the European Court of Human Rights, 37 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS. 115, 122 (2007). 
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armed conflict. Focusing on non-international armed conflicts, as IHL treaty 
law does not provide rules to regulate the procedural aspects of internment, 
it would seem that the IHRL rule requiring judicial review of the lawfulness 
of the deprivation of liberty—if not derogated—should step in to fill the 
gap.76 After all, IHRL was designed to regulate relations between individu-
als and the State, which is the precise relationship placed under stress during 
traditional civil wars.  In addition, the maxim of lex posterior would further 
support the application of IHRL, as most IHRL rules are post IHL—at least 
Common Article 3, if not the Second Additional Protocol.  
Is such review by a court feasible while engaging in armed con-
flict?77 It would, for example, seem feasible for the fewer than 300 interned 
on Guantanamo Bay,78 but what about in Iraq where there are nearly 30,000 
persons interned?79 Perhaps it is inappropriate to ask about mere feasibility, 
but IHL, unlike IHRL, strikes a balance between military necessity and hu-
manity. The question is posed out of concern that, if rules protecting the 
person—whether IHL or IHRL—make it impossible or even extremely dif-
ficult to conduct war, fewer and fewer such rules will be respected in the 
long term. If feasibility is a legitimate question to ask, the next questions 
then become who and how is one to judge what is the right balance, and 
 76  ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 9; Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, supra note 20, at art. 5; American Convention on Human Rights, supra 
note 20, at art. 7; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 20, at arts. 6–7. 
See Sassòli, supra note 42, at 387, 392–93. 
 77  The Fourth Geneva Convention, for example, does not mandate judicial review of the 
internment of civilians in international armed conflict. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 6, arts. 43, 78. The reasoning of the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, “has been interpreted in a more general manner as to 
indicate that ‘the rules developed for peacetime circumstances cannot be applied in an un-
qualified manner to the conduct of armed conflict. Rather they must be integrated in a sensi-
ble way into the structure of the law of armed conflict . . . .”  Jochen Abr. Forwein, The Rela-
tionship Between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 28 ISR.
YEARBOOK OF HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1998), citing Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 
417, 423 (1997). “However, the Court’s reasoning cannot be generalized with regard to 
human rights law as it refers to the specific provision . . . as formulated in the ICCPR . . . . 
This . . . allowed the ICJ not to address the question of whether rights laid down in human 
rights treaties in general are not absolute but relative to considerations of belligerent aims as 
reflected in the law of armed conflict.” Forwein, supra, at 12. 
 78  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced No. 1443-07 
(Dec. 28, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID 
=11591.
 79  Gordon Lubold, Do U.S. Prisons in Iraq Breed Insurgents?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Dec. 20, 2007. 
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accordingly, what is impossible or even extremely difficult to accomplish 
during armed conflict such that the rule might undermine respect for IHL?80
The pro homine principle requires that IHRL “norms must always 
be interpreted and applied in a way that most fully and adequately protects 
human beings” and, if more than one norm applies, “the one that give the 
most protection or freedom to the individual should prevail.”81 This IHRL 
principle can serve as guidance even in situations of armed conflict where a 
balancing between military necessity and considerations of humanity takes 
place.  However, determining what provides the greater protection of per-
sons must be seen through a broad and long-term perspective, rather than 
through a narrow and short-term perspective. Otherwise, one runs the risk of 
undermining the bodies of law and the overall protection they provide:   
[A]nalysis has shown significant differences between human rights and 
humanitarian law. More telling, it has demonstrated that each displays a 
peculiar normative richness and resilience likely to be weakened, if any-
thing, by over simplistic or overenthusiastic attempts to recast one in terms 
of the other. Thus, while there is indeed space for enlightened cross-
pollination and better integration of human rights and humanitarian law, 
each performs a task for which it is better suited than the other, and the 
fundamentals of each system remain partly incompatible with that of the 
other.82
SO WHAT IS THE PRACTITIONER TO DO?
All the various factors that must be considered, as well as the lack 
of specificity on how to integrate those factors so as to implement the com-
plementary relationship between IHL and IHRL in an actual situation, can 
 80  What are the standards for applying the legal rule ad impossible nemo tenetur?  If, 
given the lower numbers and location, it is feasible to provide judicial review to internees on 
Guantanamo Bay, those on Guantanamo would be entitled to judicial review but not those in 
Iraq. This contextual analysis appears very similar to that applied in IHRL when determining 
the extent of permissible derogations under IHRL treaties. If so, is transplantation of IHRL 
standards, such as its employment of the principle of proportionality—a principle understood 
differently in IHL—into an analysis of an armed conflict appropriate? Do IHRL principles 
sufficiently take account of the specificities of IHL and armed conflict situations as well as 
the importance of jus ad bellum and jus in bello distinction?  See H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 208 (2nd ed. 2004) (defining 
the principle of proportionality: “wherein the measure taken bears a reasonable relationship 
to the aim of the measure”).  Cf. Gaggoli and Kolb, supra note 75, at 137–138 (discussing 
equivalent operation of the principle of proportionality in IHRL and IHL with regard to the 
use of force). 
 81  CONDÉ, supra note 80, at 207. 
 82  RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW  349–50
(2002), cited in Michael Bothe, Books on International Law: Book Review: International 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by René Provost, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 383, 387 (2004). 
See Barnidge, supra note 1, at 95. 
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be quite frustrating for the practitioner. How is the practitioner to advance 
beyond unsatisfactory generalities describing the IHL–IHRL relationship 
and apply the appropriate rule in a particular situation?  
One suggested solution is to write a treaty of IHL enlightened by 
IHRL and a treaty of IHRL applicable in wartime enlightened by IHL, and 
hope that the two reach the same conclusions.83 Another option would be to 
analyze the inter-relationship between each provision of IHL and IHRL and 
draft a restatement of the law from the results of that analysis. However, a 
theoretical analysis of the rules alone will not provide a clear picture of the 
rules’ relationships to one another, as the differing situations in which they 
are applied must be taken into account. Also, any such analysis first requires 
the development of a framework to guide the analysis.  
Perhaps that is where one should start—by establishing, for the 
practitioner, guidelines by which to assess the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL in a given situation. The guidelines would need to direct the harmoni-
zation of the IHL and IHRL norms without compromising the two branches’ 
specific objectives and purposes. Ideally, application of these guidelines 
would provide consistent solutions regarding the potential overlap between 
the two bodies of law. The guidelines should be able to address diverse is-
sues—from procedural regulation of internment to application of IHRL in 
occupied territories.84
The guidelines need to begin with a basic framework: a preliminary 
checklist to determine the general application of the specific IHRL (and 
IHL) rules to a particular armed conflict situation. Some initial suggestions 
for the contents of this preliminary checklist outlined below may appear 
obvious, but if IHRL does not apply to the particular armed conflict situa-
tion, one need not proceed with further analysis regarding an IHL–IHRL 
relationship. If IHRL does apply, the results of this preliminary checklist 
can also indicate any limitations in the IHRL rule’s content for the given 
situation, which is necessary for further analysis of the relationship. 
The first two items proposed for the checklist are of a general na-
ture. The first item is the temporal scope of application. If there were a strict 
dichotomy between IHRL and IHL, such that IHL applies during armed 
conflict and IHRL during peacetime, complementarity between IHL and 
IHRL would be understood in a very restrictive manner where they do not 
intersect, but complement each other by working in the separate scopes of 
 83  Sassòli, supra note 42, at 395.   
 84 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF OCCUPATION: THE CASE OF KUWAIT (Walter 
Kälin ed., 1994); Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of 
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2003–2004); Damrosch & 
Oxman, supra note 34; Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
Occupied Territories Since 1967, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 44 (1990); Roberts, Transformative
Military Occupation, supra note 34.
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temporal application. This is, however, not a tenable position. Both IHL and 
IHRL treaties refer to their inter-relationship,85 and the ICJ has reaffirmed 
that IHRL as a branch of law does not cease to apply during armed con-
flict.86
The second item on the checklist is the extra-territorial application 
of IHRL; i.e., that a state’s responsibility with regard to IHRL is not purely 
territorial but also arises extra-territorially in respect of persons who are 
subject to its jurisdiction or in its power or effective control. Extra-territorial 
application of IHRL need only be addressed in the checklist if the matter to 
be regulated is not within the territory of the state party. Given disagreement 
over the extra-territorial application of IHRL, it merits a deeper discussion 
than that provided within the scope of this article.87  For purposes of outlin-
ing these guidelines, suffice it to say here that for assessing extra-territorial 
application, each IHRL treaty at issue—whether the ICCPR,88 the (Euro-
pean) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms,89 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment90 or others—should be analyzed indi-
vidually.   
 85 See discussion supra, notes 22–32. See also, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
supra note 22, ¶ 11. 
 86 See supra notes 33–35. 
 87 See Sassòli, supra note 42, at 263–68 (providing a fuller discussion of the extra-
territorial application of human rights). See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (F. Coomans & M. Kamminga eds., 2004) (discussing applications 
of international human rights law); Michael Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties 
Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupations, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
119 (2005) (discussing extraterritorial application of human rights treaties including the 
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). See also 
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda) ¶¶ 215–20, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket 
/files/116/10455.pdf; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, supra note 33, ¶¶ 107–13. 
 88 See recent decisions of the International Court of Justice, supra note 87. See also U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, supra note 22, ¶ 10. The Human Rights Committee reaffirmed its 
position. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/REV.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). For the United 
States’ arguments, see id. at Annex 1.  
 89 See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII EUR. CT. H.R. 335 (addressing whether the protec-
tion of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ex-
tended to extra-territorial acts of NATO member states). See also Al-Skeini v. Secretary of 
the State for Defense, [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin.) (concerning alleged violations of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the United 
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act committed by British forces in Iraq in 2003), appealed,
[2005] EWCA Civ. 1609, Dec. 21, 2005, appealed, [2007] UKHL 26, June 13, 2007. 
 90  The U.N. Committee Against Torture concluded that “the Convention protections 
extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of a State party and . . . that this principle in-
cludes all areas under the de facto effective control of the State party’s authorities.” U.N. 
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Next, in relation to a specific situation, one must ensure that the 
particular human right and IHL rule at issue applies. One cannot look at a 
particular IHRL rule in the abstract but must consider the parties involved in 
the particular situation. Quite obviously, the states concerned must have 
ratified the treaty in question, unless the rule is customary international law. 
This is not such a concern in IHL given that the Hague Conventions of 1907 
are generally considered to reflect customary international law and the Four 
Geneva Conventions are universally ratified. Nonetheless, it remains an 
issue for other IHL treaties, such as the Second Additional Protocol appli-
cable to non-international armed conflict and IHRL treaties without univer-
sal ratification. Also, some IHRL treaties pertain only to states of a particu-
lar region, such as Europe, the Americas, or Africa. Just as the rule of a par-
ticular treaty is non-binding on a non-state party, so is the jurisprudence 
generated by its treaty body or a court interpreting that treaty rule.91 Finally, 
before ascertaining whether an IHRL provision may provide a complement 
to an IHL rule in a given context, it is necessary to determine if the provi-
sion in question is derogable and whether the State formally derogated from 
it. Of course, such derogation must only be “to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.”92
Having worked through the preliminary checklist, one is left with 
the treaty and customary rules, including their limitations,93 which apply to 
a given armed conflict between specific parties. From there, one can move 
on to the guidelines that direct the analysis between the rules themselves, in 
order to determine their inter-relationship. Those guidelines would need to 
outline an approach regarding the use of interpretative tools, such as lex
                                                     
Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Crown Dependencies and 
Overseas Territories, ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004). The Committee 
Against Torture restated this position in a subsequent report. Committee Against Torture, 
Conclusions and Recommendations on the United States’ Second Periodic Report, ¶15, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (Jul. 25, 2006). See also U.N. Committee Against Torture, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Response of the United 
States to the List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic 
Report of the United States of America, at 32–37, http://www.state.gov/documents/organiz 
ation/68662.pdf (arguing the U.S. position on the non-extra-territorial application of article 3 
of the Convention).  
 91 See Kreiger, supra note 23, at 278. This can be damaging to both IHL into IHRL. See
id. at 290–91. 
 92  ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 4(1); see also Convention for Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 20, at art.15(1); American Convention on 
Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 27(1). The principle of proportionality as applied here 
under IHRL should not be confused with the principle of proportionality as applied by IHL. 
See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii).  
 93 See, e.g., Kreiger, supra note 23, at 281–82 (discussing human rights’ limitation claus-
es). 
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specialis and lex posterior. If the use, for example, of lex specialis is 
deemed appropriate, the guidelines need to help determine which of the 
applicable rules is the more general and which is the more specific for the 
application of lex specialis. Such guidelines need to be sufficiently flexible 
to take into account that lex specialis is contextual, in that it addresses indi-
vidual rules in specific circumstances (rather than entire bodies of law), and 
yet rigid enough to assess the goals of the branches of law concerned and 
the international system in its totality. Despite the challenges of doing so,94
such guidelines would provide a framework for decision makers and practi-
tioners in order to better ensure that subjective determinations do not exploit 
the international legal system. Finally, in the development of guidelines, 
attention needs to be paid to the differences between IHL and IHRL, in par-
ticular, the fact that IHL of non-international armed conflicts applies equally 
to state and non-state actors. 
This is a highly complex (and very ambitious) endeavor, but the 
successful development of such guidelines would provide an analytical for-
mat for clarifying the relationship between IHL and IHRL rules, including 
their content. In this way, a clearer picture of applicable law can be drawn. 
This picture may show that there are gaps in the law applicable to armed 
conflict, particularly non-international armed conflict. Or, it may indicate 
the existence of specific and legally binding minimum standards applying at 
all times, thus avoiding the difficult qualification of a situation as an inter-
national armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or internal distur-
bances. It could permit the practitioner to confidently promote the creation 
of a new treaty, because knowing the existing law ensures that an inadver-
tent lowering of protective standards will not occur. Regardless, the results 
will harmonize existing law and avert pitfalls. 
Some may postulate that this is a useless endeavor—not only be-
cause of its difficulty but also due to the inherent limitations of IHRL, such 
as its derogation clauses. While it is true, for instance, that the procedural 
IHRL provisions regulating internment are subject to possible derogation 
during armed conflict, that is hardly the case for all IHRL provisions rele-
vant to armed conflict situations. In addition, rules are not always dero-
gated, and, even if they are in certain instances, knowing how IHL and 
IHRL apply when IHRL is not derogated, enables one to set the minimum 
bar to be used when negotiating new instruments to protect persons applica-
ble at all times.
 94  “[I]t has been difficult or even impossible to apply the said requirements or to create 
any specific guidelines for the application of lex specialis.” Lindroos, supra note 36, at 48. 
Recent attention to the matter of norm conflict in international law will facilitate this effort. 
See PAUWELYN, supra note 37; ILC Report of Study Group, supra note 36; Koskenniemi 
Study, supra note 37. See also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 36; Lindroos, supra note 36.  
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The urgent need, often expressed today, to address the challenges of 
regulating the procedural aspects of internment—whether in armed conflict 
or peacetime—may not await development and application of these pro-
posed guidelines. Perhaps on this specific issue, new rules—whether in the 
form of a new treaty or minimum standards—should, despite the risks men-
tioned, now be written . . . but, once created, how would the relationship 
between these new rules and the other IHL and IHRL rules be determined?
